



EXERCISE BORDER BRIDGE
5-9 March 2018

Joint Exercise Report



Prepared by

Amanda Cleary - New South Wales Department of Primary Industries

Chris Lavin – Biosecurity Queensland




Members from the Operations and Planning functions in the Joint Local Control Centre, Toowoomba QLD

“Overall well done to the organisers of the activity, a very good exercise and I learnt a lot, even having been in a number of real events”.



Brisbane, QLD



Orange, NSW

Members from the State Coordination Centres

Terms, abbreviations & acronyms	Meaning/Description
AHA	Animal Health Australia
BORIS	Biosecurity Online Resource and Information System
BQ	Biosecurity Queensland
CEWG	Communications and Engagement Working Group
DAWR	Department of Agriculture and Water Resources
EXCON	Exercise Control
JLCC	Joint Local Control Centre
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
LLS	Local Land Services
NBCEN	National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network
NBRT	National Biosecurity Response Team
NSW DPI	New South Wales Department of Primary Industries
PHA	Plant Health Australia
QLD DAF	Queensland Department of Agriculture and Fisheries
SCC	State Coordination Centre

Executive summary

Exercise Border Bridge was the largest simulated biosecurity response exercise in Australia in the past 10 years. More than 260 people from across Australia participated in the exercise, including representatives from government and industry.

Exercise Border Bridge (the Exercise) was conducted from 5 to 9 March 2018. The aim of the Exercise was to advance Australia's capabilities to respond to a nationally significant cross border biosecurity emergency and strengthen partnerships with biosecurity stakeholders.

The Exercise involved the establishment and management of two separate State Coordination Centres (SCC) in New South Wales (NSW) and Queensland (QLD), and a Joint Local Control Centre (JLCC) in Toowoomba, in response to the outbreak of an emergency animal disease (Lumpy Skin Disease) and a plant pest incursion (Giant African Snail), which impacted on both states simultaneously.

The Exercise enabled New South Wales Department of Primary Industries (NSW DPI) and Biosecurity Queensland (BQ) (part of Queensland Department of Agriculture and Industries) to test their capability and capacity to respond effectively to biosecurity emergencies and to develop skills, knowledge and experience in an exercise environment.

The Exercise strengthened partnerships between government and industry stakeholders and demonstrated NSW DPI and BQ's ability to effectively manage and control complex biosecurity emergencies.

Engagement and promotion of the Exercise successfully raised the profile of the importance of preparedness on a national level.

Positive impacts identified during the Exercise included:

- Incident management structures consistent with the Biosecurity Incident Management System were implemented.
- Exercise participants across the three centres showed a genuine willingness to work together, cooperate and overcome issues.
- National Biosecurity Response Team (NBRT) members effectively integrated into the response and provided positive contributions to problem solving, leadership and knowledge.
- Successful management and completion of the exercise design and planning was achieved through the participation of planning, writing, and logistics team members who possessed appropriate skill sets.

"Great experience and practice in a response, without the usual pressure of the 'real thing'."

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

When a cross border incursion occurs, government agencies should carefully consider whether a joint response is practical and feasible early in the response.

Recommendation 2

Implement a program of training (including exercises) to ensure emergency response knowledge, skills, and competencies are maintained. Training should cover policies, standard operating procedures, roles and responsibilities associated with a response.

Recommendation 3

Provide training on legislation to relevant personnel likely to be involved in biosecurity emergency responses, to ensure sufficient, applicable knowledge of emergency legislative provisions and instruments.

Recommendation 4

Deliver education sessions or fact sheets to assist industry to understand terminology with regard to stopping livestock movements.

Recommendation 5

Provide facilities that can be readily utilised and are fit-for-purpose for emergency response activities including access to ICT support and real time display capability.

Recommendation 6

Avoid accessing and using unfamiliar ICT systems from different jurisdictions in any future joint responses, especially in the early stages.

Recommendation 7

Implement training, including refresher training, on systems relevant to each jurisdiction to maintain system user skills and knowledge.

Recommendation 8

Continue NBRT collaboration and participation in exercises.

Recommendation 9

Clearly differentiate NBRT mentor roles from NBRT participant roles during simulation exercises.

Recommendation 10

Appoint an Exercise Coordinator to manage the design, planning, conduct and reporting of future large-scale, functional exercises.

Recommendation 11

Provide situation updates and information to participants in the lead up to future exercises (where appropriate).

Recommendation 12

Include State focussed objectives in future large-scale joint exercises.



NSW SCC – Orange.



JLCC - Toowoomba

Exercise milestones




Table of contents

<i>Executive summary</i>	3
<i>Recommendations</i>	4
<i>Exercise milestones</i>	6
<i>Introduction</i>	8
<i>Aim</i>	8
<i>Scope</i>	8
<i>Exercise objectives</i>	9
<i>Governance</i>	9
<i>Final report</i>	9
<i>Exercise planning</i>	9
<i>Exercise Planning Team coordination and structure</i>	10
<i>Exercise management and control</i>	10
<i>Schedule of activities</i>	11
<i>Functional exercise locations</i>	13
<i>Exercise documentation</i>	13
<i>Observers</i>	13
<i>Communication and engagement</i>	14
<i>Evaluation</i>	15
<i>Evaluation Team</i>	15
<i>Evaluation methodology</i>	15
<i>Insights and findings</i>	16
<i>Appendix 1: Exercise Border Bridge schedule of activities</i>	23

Introduction

Exercise Border Bridge (the Exercise) was a cross border biosecurity emergency exercise conducted by the New South Wales Department of Primary Industries (NSW DPI) and the Queensland Department of Agriculture and Fisheries (QLD DAF) in March 2018.

The Exercise marked the 10 year anniversary of the 2007-2008 Equine Influenza (EI) response in NSW and QLD. The EI outbreak was the largest cross border biosecurity emergency in recent times. Other large responses include Bovine Johne's Disease responses in 2012 and 2013, Panama Disease tropical race 4 in 2015 and White Spot Disease in 2016.

The Exercise was an opportunity to evaluate the capabilities of the NSW (DPI) and Biosecurity Queensland (BQ) to respond effectively and efficiently to a biosecurity incident¹ that directly impacted both states simultaneously.

The exercise name "Border Bridge" is a reference to the historic bridge that crosses the Macintyre River at Goondiwindi, QLD. During the early 1900s the bridge was the main hub for freight crossing the border between the two States, where duties were collected by Customs.

The Exercise was a significant undertaking. It comprised two lead-in discussion activities and a five day functional component. The functional component was the largest biosecurity emergency exercise undertaken in the last 10 years and required 18 months of planning and included 260 participants.

A formal governance structure was in place to guide planning, execution, and reporting of the Exercise.

Aim

To advance Australia's capability to respond to a nationally significant cross border biosecurity emergency and strengthen partnerships with biosecurity stakeholders.

Scope

This Exercise included the establishment and management of a joint (NSW and QLD) Local Control Centre (JLCC) and the activation of two separate State Coordination Centres (SCCs).

The simulated response was as a result the outbreak of a significant emergency animal disease (Lumpy Skin Disease) and a significant plant pest incursion (Giant African Snail) that impacted both NSW and QLD simultaneously.

The Exercise explored NSW and QLD biosecurity legislation, information management systems, technology and processes. The Exercise also assessed the ability of the National Biosecurity Response Team (NBRT) to integrate into a cross border biosecurity response.

¹ Biosecurity incident means an outbreak of a pest or disease.

Exercise objectives

The objectives sought to be achieved were to:

1. Assess the ability of NSW and QLD to jointly respond to a biosecurity incident that impacts both jurisdictions.
2. Assess each jurisdiction's ability to use their new biosecurity legislation in response to a cross border biosecurity incident.
3. Assess response requirements for a joint cross border biosecurity response.
4. Identify, explore and resolve issues associated with information management systems, technology and processes in a cross border biosecurity incident.
5. Assess the ability of the NBRT to integrate and contribute to a cross border biosecurity response.

Governance

The executive leadership and management of NSW DPI and BQ were responsible for sponsorship and approval of the exercise.

A Steering Committee was established with executive membership from NSW DPI, BQ and DAWR to guide planning, execution, and reporting of the Exercise

A Planning Team made up of representatives from NSW DPI, BQ, DAWR, NSW Local Land Services (LLS), Animal Health Australia (AHA), Plant Health Australia (PHA) and the National Biosecurity Response Team (NBRT) developed the Exercise. The Exercise Planning Team was chaired by the NSW DPI Program Coordinator.

Exercise reports were prepared by the NSW DPI Exercise Program Coordinator in conjunction with the Exercise Planning Team.

Final report

The Exercise Border Bridge Steering Committee is responsible for the endorsement of this Report, which has been co-authored by NSW DPI and BQ. The Report will be distributed to government and industry stakeholders. Public release of the final report will not occur unless authorised.


Exercise planning

The Exercise Planning Team maintained responsibility for planning all aspects of the exercise and related activities, including:

- Achieving appropriate approvals and providing the necessary reports;
- Consulting with appropriate stakeholders;
- Coordinating corporate and exercise public information and media enquiries relevant to the Exercise;
- Developing and implementing the evaluation methodology for the Exercise and lead-in activities;
- Writing the Exercise scenario and developing supporting documents, including exercise inputs;
- Facilitating lead-in activities and controlling the functional exercise;
- Managing logistics (including facilities, equipment and services);
- Consulting representatives from industry and other relevant agencies during the exercise planning process;
- Managing work health and safety; and
- Security arrangements.


Exercise Planning Team coordination and structure

The Exercise Planning Team established smaller working groups as shown below. During the functional exercise, members of the Exercise Planning Team participated as Exercise Control Staff (EXCON).



Exercise management and control

The functional exercise was managed by a dedicated Exercise Control Team, made up of and appointed by the Exercise Planning Team as outlined below.



Schedule of activities

A detailed schedule of activities guided the design, planning, conduct and evaluation of Exercise Border Bridge. A schedule of activities is provided at Appendix 1.

Digital Bridge

Digital Bridge was a discussion activity undertaken in preparation for the Exercise to identify, explore and resolve issues associated with establishing and operating a joint co-located incident management team.

The outcomes from this activity were used to inform the planning of the Exercise, including:

- Confirming the facilities in Toowoomba were suitable for a JLCC.
- Identifying and documenting the Incident Management Team structure and state participants.
- Developing Standard Operating Procedures for setting up a JLCC for the Exercise.
- Agreeing on the information and communication technology systems to be used.



Above: Digital Bridge participants.

Border Law and Order

Border Law and Order was a discussion activity to investigate the potential application of NSW, QLD and Commonwealth biosecurity legislation during a cross border biosecurity incident.

The outcomes from this activity were used to inform the planning of the Exercise, including:

- Developing clear procedures for using legal instruments such as control orders simultaneously in NSW and QLD.
- Establishing NSW and QLD working groups to develop documents and orders prior to the Exercise.



Border Law and Order participants.

Other meeting and schedules

Monthly planning meetings and master schedule run through meetings were also held in preparation for the Exercise, as outlined in Table 1.

Table 1: Schedule of key Exercise activities.

Dates	Activity
Lead-in activities	
5-6 Sep, 2017 (2 days)	Digital Bridge discussion activity – Joint local control centre logistics and joint operations (systems, facilities, and ICT)
10-11 Oct 2017 (2 days)	Border Law and Order discussion activity – Legislation
Functional exercise	
Jan and Feb 2018	Master schedule run through
01-02 Mar 2018	Set up facilities and test systems and ICT
05 Mar 2018	Bump in of exercise participants Briefings, induction and lead in activities as appropriate
06 Mar 2018	Functional exercise commences
08 Mar 2018	Functional exercise concludes Hot debrief Pack up facilities
09 Mar 2018	Bump out of exercise participants Exercise Planning Team debrief
30 July 2018	Evaluation report provided to Planning team
31 July 2018	Final Exercise Report produced by Exercise Planning Team

Functional exercise locations

- **Joint Local Control Centre** – Toowoomba
QLD DAF Regional Office - 203 Tor Street, Toowoomba QLD 4350.
- **NSW State Coordination Centre** – Orange
NSW DPI Head Office - 161 Kite Street, Orange NSW 2800.
- **QLD State Coordination Centre** – Brisbane
QLD DAF Head Office - 41 George Street, Brisbane QLD 4000.

Exercise documentation

A range of documents were developed as part of the Exercise. They include, but were not limited to:

- Exercise Planning Team:
 - Exercise plan;
 - Logistics plan;
 - Communication and engagement plan; and
 - Risk register.
- Exercise participants:
 - Joining instructions, including pre-exercise information; and
 - Exercise briefing materials.
- Exercise Control Team:
 - Sequence of events;
 - Background information and profiles;
 - Master schedule;
 - Inputs and attachments;
 - Facilitator checklists (identifying required actions and/or outputs); and
 - Briefing and debriefing guides.
- Evaluation Team:
 - Evaluation plan;
 - Evaluator briefing;
 - Data collection templates; and
 - Evaluator reporting templates.

All exercise documentation was clearly marked with the words EXERCISE ONLY. All documents provided during the Exercise, and relating to the scenario, were returned to Exercise Control at the conclusion of the Exercise.

Observers

A number of observers were invited to attend at each of the locations for both the lead-in activities and the Exercise. An Observer Policy was developed in order to manage the participation by observers.

Observers included the NSW Cross Border Commissioner and representatives from emergency services, government departments, industry and local government.

Communication and engagement

The Communications and Engagement Working Group (CEWG) consisted of representatives from all exercise partners and the National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network (NBCEN). The group was responsible for the development and implementation of the Communication and Engagement Strategy (the Engagement Strategy).

The objectives of the Engagement Strategy were to:

- Inform target audiences about Exercise Border Bridge and prevent the exercise activities being mistaken for a real pest or disease incident;
- Promote the benefits of undertaking/investing in the joint exercise (in terms of biosecurity preparedness);
- Manage public perception risks associated with running a biosecurity exercise (such as market access impacts through release of inappropriate information); and
- Engage and inform relevant stakeholders to contribute to the exercise activities.

The CEWG developed a digital communications kit for participating government and industry organisations to ensure consistent branding and messaging across all communication channels. The CEWG also drafted the public information and industry liaison inputs to be used in the Exercise.

Communication with the media before, during and after the exercise was coordinated by the CEWG in accordance with the Strategy. This included notifying the National Biosecurity Committee, Animal Health Committee, Plant Health Committee, Invasive Plants and Animals Committee and the World Organisation for Animal Health of the Exercise.

Over the course of planning and executing the exercise, 25 different public platforms mentioned Exercise Border Bridge. Exercise Border Bridge Website, Facebook and Twitter were effective promotion platforms in combination with radio, television and newspapers.

AHA and PHA engaged with Industry Liaison representatives prior to the Exercise. AHA also provided Emergency Animal Disease Industry Liaison training prior to the Exercise as part of the engagement strategy.



Exercise writing workshop.



Exercise Control members in Toowoomba.

Evaluation

Exercise evaluation included:

- Evaluating the extent to which the exercise aim and objectives were achieved;
- Evaluating participants' responses to the developing exercise scenario; and
- Evaluating the design and conduct of the exercise.

The objectives of Exercise Border Bridge were developed by the Exercise Planning Team and endorsed by the Exercise Steering Committee. In addition to this, the Exercise Planning Team developed sub-objectives to assist with the evaluation of the exercise. The scenario-driven inputs were designed to assist the Exercise participants to achieve the exercise objectives.

Evaluation Team

The Evaluation Team was responsible for the planning and conducting the evaluation. It was led by an Evaluation Manager and was selected based on their level of experience and subject matter expertise, with members drawn largely from those agencies directly involved in the Exercise, additional support was drawn from NT and ACT.

Evaluation methodology

The *Biosecurity Emergency Management – Evaluation and Lessons Management Guide* guided the evaluation process.

The lead-in activities, Digital Bridge and Border Law and Order helped to identify specific sub-objectives which formed the basis of the evaluation.

Evaluators were briefed by the Evaluation Manager before the functional exercise to ensure their roles, responsibilities and tasks were understood. Evaluators also received a written exercise brief outlining the information covered in the verbal brief.

As the Exercise was conducted, evaluators:

- Observed outputs (written and verbal) produced by Exercise participants;
- Observed the Exercise;
- Obtained feedback from Exercise Control members;
- Obtained feedback from participants whilst undertaking direct observations (when appropriate);
- Recorded comments and discussions at briefings and debriefings; and
- Provided notated summaries of observations on a daily basis.

Following the Exercise, the Evaluation Manager substantiated information collected by evaluators by:

- Interviewing Exercise Control members and facilitators;
- Debriefing with the Exercise Control staff debriefing; and
- Consulting evaluators to clarify observations made.

Standard evaluator collection templates and questionnaire templates from the *Biosecurity Emergency Management – Evaluation and Lessons Management Guide* were used to evaluate the Exercise.

The Exercise was evaluated against performance criteria as outlined in the Public Safety Training Package unit of competency of *Design and manage activities which exercise elements of emergency management* and the *Biosecurity Emergency Management – Exercise Management Guide*.

The total number of observations recorded was 1201 and these observations were grouped and categorised by the related Exercise objectives and sub-objectives.

“The reality of the exercise resulted in activity immersion rather than superficial role-plays”.

Insights and findings

Objective 1 - Assess the ability of NSW and QLD to jointly respond to a biosecurity incident that impacts both jurisdictions.

Sub-objective 1.1:

An appropriate incident management structure is implemented and is effective.

Sub-objective 1.2:

Mixed jurisdictional staffing are able to implement a joint (NSW/QLD) response strategy.

Sub-objective 1.3:

Established arrangements including policies, plans, procedures and work instructions are applied.

Sub-objective 1.4:

The Incident Management structure (2xSCC and 1xJLCC) is able to deliver effective outcomes.

Sub-objective 1.5:

Field Operations in both jurisdictions are coordinated from a single JLCC.

Sub-objective 1.6:

Established response structure is able to manage response to multiple concurrent incidents.

Summary – Objective 1 was generally met.

While both NSW and QLD were able to establish a JLCC in Toowoomba, and SCCs in Orange and Brisbane, there were operational issues identified.

Observations:

- Once roles and responsibilities were established according to the incident management structure, mixed jurisdictional staff worked well together, complemented each other's skill sets, problem solved and drew from interagency experience across the three centres.
- An appropriate response structure was implemented in all three control centres that enabled the participants to manage the dual scenarios, however the complexity of running two scenarios within an exercise environment within a short timeframe did impact the response.
- Staff were positive, engaged and prepared to work around limitations, explore IT access fixes and move to manual processes where necessary.
- Document retention and filing presented issues when jointly responding to a biosecurity incident using a joint management structure.
- There were some inconsistencies between how each SCC undertook Emergency Animal Disease Response Plans, Destruction, Disposal and Decontamination planning and execution, which impacted consistency of the response.
- There were inconsistencies in referencing Infected Properties Identification Codes across the three centres.
- The use of jurisdictional systems that were unfamiliar impacted the centres' ability to effectively respond.
- Application of policies, procedures and work instructions was delayed due to a lack of understanding of roles, responsibilities and processes in a joint response across the three centres by participants.

Recommendation 1

When a cross border incursion occurs, government agencies should carefully consider whether a joint response is practical and feasible early in the response.

Recommendation 2

Implement a program of training (including exercises) to ensure emergency response knowledge, skills, and competencies are maintained. Training should cover policies, standard operating procedures, roles and responsibilities associated with a response.

Objective 2 – Assess each jurisdiction's ability to use their new biosecurity legislation in response to a cross border biosecurity incident.

Sub-objective 2.1: Appropriate legislation and instruments are applied to the response.

Sub-objective 2.2: Appropriate delegations and powers are able to be applied to the relevant legislation.

Sub-objective 2.3: Ability to apply operational outcomes across both jurisdictions under dual Acts.

Sub-objective 2.4: Implications of legislative constraints on data sharing are identified and addressed.

Summary – Objective 2 was met.

The appropriate sections of jurisdictional legislation were applied in both NSW and QLD during the response.

Observations:

- Industry Liaisons noted that “producers” were confused by the different terminology used for stopping movements of livestock by Queensland’s “emergency order” and NSW’s “livestock standstill”.
- There was a lack of understanding among some participants of deeds, legislation and the restrictions.

Recommendation 3

Provide training on legislation to relevant personnel likely to be involved in biosecurity emergency responses, to ensure sufficient, applicable knowledge of emergency legislative provisions and instruments.

Recommendation 4

Deliver education sessions or fact sheets to assist industry to understand terminology with regard to stopping livestock movements.

Objective 3 – Assess response requirements for a joint cross border biosecurity response.

Sub-objective 3.1: Suitable facilities are established to manage a response.

Sub-objective 3.2: Effectiveness of connectivity within and across centres.

Sub-objective 3.3: The facilities provide interoperability of systems and processes for managing the response.

Summary – Objective 3 was partially met.

The facilities across the three centres were suitable, however improvements would be required to ensure effective connectivity and interoperability of systems and processes to manage responses.

Observations:

- Exercise participants across all centres showed a genuine willingness to work together, cooperate and overcome issues.
- Some facilities were not large enough and did not have the appropriate equipment and layout.
- Non-NSW staff had difficulties accessing NSW DPI systems and non-QLD staff had problems accessing and using the QLD BORIS and BQ Maps systems.
- It is important to have access to information and communication technology (ICT) support to resolve ICT related issues such as WiFi and access in a timely manner.
- Display of real time maps is pivotal to situational awareness.

Recommendation 5

Provide facilities that can be readily utilised and are fit-for-purpose for emergency response activities including access to ICT support and real time display capability.

Recommendation 6

Avoid accessing and using unfamiliar ICT systems from different jurisdictions in any future joint responses, especially in the early stages.

Objective 4 – Identify, explore and resolve issues associated with information management systems, technology and processes in a cross border biosecurity incident.

Sub-objective 4.1: Information systems deployed in centres are available, appropriate and utilised by participants.

Sub-objective 4.2: Information management systems support shared situational awareness and decision making.

Sub-objective 4.3: Information management systems are reliable.

Sub-objective 4.4: Cross border operational activities and strategies benefit from joint operational systems.

Summary – Objective 4 was partially met.

Observations:

- Firewalls and remote access platforms made shifting between State-based systems difficult and this posed challenges when trying to achieve joint situational awareness.
- Ultimately each state used its own systems and not "joint systems" to obtain situational awareness to make informed decisions.
- Some participants didn't fully utilise their exercise 'bump in' time for getting assistance with IT and other system related issues and this resulted in extra time taken during the Exercise.
- The Exercise did highlight the deficiencies in systems and their ability to integrate for the response.
- There were not clear lines of communication within and across the JLCC and SCCs. This was a significant issue that hampered the ability of exercise participants to better manage the issues and the response.
- Communication and access to information systems was not consistent between the JLCC and the SCCs.

Recommendation 1

When a cross border incursion occurs, government agencies should carefully consider whether a joint response is practical and feasible early in the response.

Recommendation 6

Avoid accessing and using unfamiliar ICT systems from different jurisdictions in any future joint responses, especially in the early stages.

Recommendation 7

Implement training, including refresher training, on systems relevant to each jurisdiction to maintain system user skills and knowledge.



WebEOC being used for task requests.



BQ Maps being used for mapping infected premises.

Objective 5 – Assess the ability of the National Biosecurity Response Team (NBRT) to integrate and contribute to a cross border biosecurity response.

Sub-objective 5.1: NBRT members integrate effectively into the response.

Sub-objective 5.2: NBRT members are able to assist, and make a positive contribution to, the response.

Summary of key findings – Objective 5 was fully achieved.

Observations:

- NBRT members were a valuable resource as they were able to draw on their previous experience in understanding the changing requirements of the response. This enabled them to anticipate future response requirements.
- Some NBRT members were assigned as NBRT Mentors who could assist and guide personnel in their functional roles i.e. Planning, Logistics etc. Other NBRT members were assigned as ‘advisors’ who could also assist personnel in their functional roles. This distinction was not adequately explained to participants, which made it confusing for NBRT members and other Exercise participants to understand their roles.
- Interstate NBRT members experienced difficulties in accessing IT systems and email, which made communications and records management difficult at times.

Recommendation 8

Continue NBRT collaboration and participation in exercises.

Recommendation 9

Clearly differentiate NBRT mentor roles from NBRT participant roles during simulation exercises.



NBRT integration at the NSW SCC.



NBRT integration at the JLCC.

“I enjoyed working with the NBRT members in my operations area as well as the participants in BQ”.

Assess how the Exercise design and planning contributed to the successful conduct or otherwise of the exercise

The Evaluation Team also assessed how the design and planning contributed to the successful conduct of the Exercise. The exercise management phases of design, planning and conduct were evaluated.

Summary of key findings – The Exercise design and planning accounted for a successful exercise.

Observations:

- The exercise planning and writing teams included appropriately-skilled representatives from NSW DPI, BQ, DAWR, LLS, PHA and AHA. This enabled the management and completion of the exercise design and planning phases, with the Exercise Program Coordinator ensuring oversight of all components of the Exercise.
- Sharing data across States to utilise in database was problematic.
- Briefing packs provided on day one of the Exercise contained a significant amount of documentation.
- Participants found there was insufficient time for them to review [the information packs] and recommended that information could have been provided in real time leading up to the Exercise, reflecting what would happen in a real event.
- Participants expected to find more documentation and briefings on their roles and responsibilities.
- The Exercise experience was enhanced by having Industry Liaisons and NBRT members.
- Having additional state focused objectives within the scope of the exercise would have enhance the learning opportunities from the Exercise.

Recommendation 10

Appoint an Exercise Coordinator to manage the design, planning, conduct and reporting of future large-scale, functional exercises.

Recommendation 11

Provide situation updates and information to participants in the lead up to future exercises (where appropriate).

Recommendation 12

Include State focussed objectives in future large-scale joint exercises.



JLCC Toowoomba

Appendix 1: Exercise Border Bridge schedule of activities

Date	Activity name	Activity type	Location	Governance Group	Status
April 2017	Develop the Exercise Concept document.	Exercise Concept document	N/A	Program Coordinator	Complete
April 2017	Endorsement of the exercise concept	Exercise Concept document	N/A	Exercise Steering Committee	Complete
April 2017	Provide justification to Exercise Directors for the allocation of additional staff to undertake planning and preparedness of Exercise	Obtain additional resources	N/A	NSW DPI Program Coordinator	Complete
April 2017	Planning Team will: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Identify the functions that need to be managed to ensure the success of the Exercise and manage associated projects. – Develop a risk register. – Develop the exercise plan. 	Establish Exercise Planning Team	N/A	NSW DPI Program Coordinator	Complete
May 2017	Finalise and document individual roles and responsibilities	Identify roles and responsibilities	N/A	NSW DPI Program Coordinator	Complete
July 2017	Finalise exercise plan	Exercise Plan	N/A	Exercise Planning Team	Complete
July 2017	Develop and implement endorsed media, communication and engagement plan	Media, communication and engagement plan	N/A	Exercise Planning Team	Complete
Sep 2017	Final endorsement by Exercise Steering Committee	Execute Exercise Plan	N/A	NSW DPI Program Coordinator	Complete
5-6 Sep 2017	Lead-in activity Digital Bridge Joint operations (systems, facilities & IT) and logistics	2 day facilitated discussion exercise	Toowoomba	Exercise Planning Team	Complete
10-11 Oct 2017	Lead-in activity Border law and order	2 day facilitated discussion exercise	Sydney	Exercise Planning Team	Complete
5-9 March 2018	Undertake functional exercise	Exercise	Toowoomba	Exercise Planning Team	Complete
June 2018	Coordinate post exercise evaluation and lessons identified log	Evaluation Report	N/A	Evaluation Manager	Complete
September 2018	Complete final Joint Exercise Report	Joint Exercise Report	N/A	Steering Committee + Exercise Sponsors	Complete